Why Corporations Must be Legal Persons
OK, this topic is too important to let drop just yet.A few days ago I asked what rights corporations should have. That posting generated some useful comments, but some of those comments, and other things I've been reading online, suggested an animosity to the very notion of rights for corporations and the legal personhood that goes along with it.
So, I'll put this forward succinctly: legal personhood for corporations is not optional. It's absolutely fundamental to modern commerce. To believe otherwise, you basically have to be an anarchic anti-capitalist; indeed, you have to be against the very notion of large-scale cooperation and division of labour. But you're not, are you?
At heart, legal personhood just means that a corporation can be taken seriously by courts: it can be treated as a thing, separate from the human persons that make up the corporation at any particular time.
This point does not imply any particular list of rights: the items on that list, and the limits thereon, are still very much up for debate. But what cannot be denied is that corporations must be treated as legal persons. The recent deliberations of the U.S. Supreme Court is something of a red herring in this regard. As is the American legal trend, in the decades after the Civil War, to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations. Those are particular good-or-bad decisions; they tell us little if anything about the wisdom of granting some form of personhood to corporations. That idea, by the way, is a very old one, stretching back far before the 19th century. Corporate personhood is not an American invention or a conspiracy. It's a feature of every modern economy.
(For a lively and informative history of the corporation, and other sorts of companies, see The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea.)
Look, for starters, at a few other kinds of legal persons:
- universities
- churches
- nonprofits
- political parties
- governments
- estates
- etc.
None of those is a human person. But courts treat them as persons. And you can imagine the important activities that would simply be impossible if they weren't regarded as persons (i.e., taken as objects of legal rights and obligations) by courts. The university I work for couldn't own the land it sits on, and couldn't issue me a salary. Greenpeace couldn't have a bank account. Political parties would not be able to fundraise, and to hire accountants to keep the books. Governments couldn't be taken to court. Churches couldn't be sued for, e.g., sexual abuse by priests . And estates — well, what would an estate even be? Just the no-longer-owned stuff of a former person, now up for grabs.
So, back to corporations. If a corporation were not regarded in at least some ways as a legal person, at least 2 very bad consequences would follow.
1) If corporations were not (in some sense) persons, they could not own property or hold bank accounts. And without those 2 things, operations would literally be impossible. (And that goes not just for corporations, but for all other large organizations, including cooperatives and nonprofits.)
2) If corporations were not (in some sense) persons, they could not be sued or fined or charged with crimes. You could sue or charge particular people within the corporation, of course, but that's at least sometimes not really effective. For all I know, no one who worked at Exxon back when the Exxon Valdez spilled millions of gallons of oil onto the Alaskan coastline 20 years ago still works there. Should that mean no further legal action can be taken with regard to those events? Or that you've got to chase down people who have retired or now work at other companies? In some cases, you might want to do just that. But most of us share the intuition, I think, that Exxon itself, as a company, is responsible (too). If Exxon were not a legal person, there would be no way for anyone to take legal action against it.
So, yes, the debate over which rights (and responsibilities) corporate "persons" should have is a good and important one. But please, let's be rid of the silly notion that corporate personhood is itself, in some sense, just a mistake.
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p.s. I'm not a legal scholar. If I'm wrong on any legal points, and if any readers are qualified to help me out in that regard, I'd be much obliged.












8 Comments:
Both 1) and 2) above seem to me to be deeply confused as to what exactly you are trying to clarify.
True, in western legal systems only legal persons can own private property or enter into contracts. But, obviously, that doesn't mean that only artificial persons can. If I had the money (and didn't care about squandering it, since I want to prove a point), there'd be nothing stopping me from starting up my own university as a sole proprietorship or as a partnership. In that case, the legal person would be a natural person, me. I can't think of any sort of enterprise--charity, church or even political party--that couldn't, in principle, be organized as a proprietorship or a partnership. So, insofar as what you say under 1) suggests that artificial legal personhood is a necessary condition for certain kinds of operations to be possible...well, that's either just false or trivial (i.e., corporate operations characterized by artificial legal personality are not possible without legal personhood).
The point under 2), however, seems to me a much more serious misunderstanding. Why is it the case that many (especially large-scale) businesses are organized as corporations rather than as proprietorships or partnerships (i.e., organization where legal personality is confined to or shared among natural persons)? The obvious, totally predominant reason is that corporations enjoy limited liability. If there was no legal person called "Exxon Corp.," the alternative isn't that no one would pay for the Valdez cleanup. Instead, assuming Exxon's operations ever got going in the first place, the owners of the company would face unlimited personal liability for damages, rather than liability being limited to the value of their investment.
That is to say, what I think what you really want to be looking at is the magic of limited liability in making certain sorts of enterprises possible. Artificial personhood per se contributes much less than you seem to think: Immortality of the corporate entity, the power to make impersonal organizational rules and, well, not all that much else.
By
Will Buschert, at 7:03 PM
Will:
Thanks. Let me try to clarify.
First, I'm not arguing that nothing other than an artificial person could hold a bank account. That would be obviously false. I'm just saying that without personhood, you couldn't have modern corporations, or indeed any but the simplest of business forms. You could have big companies, but you couldn't have widely-held corporations. (Note that partnerships, too, are considered legal persons.) In practice, it would mean that only wealthy individuals (wealth acquired how?) could do business on a large scale. I doubt many of the would-be critics of corporate personhood is willing to bite that bullet.
(An admission: it was a regrettable red herring on my part to throw in the parenthetical comment about other kinds of institutions, under point 1 above. It's useful to recall how many other kinds of artificial persons there are, but that's not germane to the point I was making there.)
Second, yes, clearly limited liability is a key benefit of modern incorporation: it's why so many organizations are constituted that way. Limited liability isn't an essential ingredient of corporate personhood, but it's a very common one. But without at least some form of legal personhood, corporations wouldn't get off the ground in the first place. And yes, you're right, the alternative to limited liability is, well, unlimited liability, but that still leaves us with the problem of tracking down and holding accountable the many individuals who...well, who what? Which individuals would one even try to hold accountable for the Exxon Valdez, beyond the pilot of the ship? He could be dead, for all we know. And the shareholders today aren't the shareholders from 20 years ago, likely. As things stand, Exxon is legally liable for things it — the legal person known as "Exxon" — did 20 years ago, and it can be held accountable, be forced to pay restitution, etc.
As for your last point: I don't think there's any magic list of characteristics that adds up to personhood. Limited liability is just one variable. Legal personhood clearly admits of degrees: an entity could in theory be permitted to own property, but have no other rights at all, and would still in that regard be a legal person. There's a whole list of characteristics (in particular, legal rights and responsibilities) that contribute to personhood. Each kind of legal "person" has a different subset. No one right or responsibility can be equated with personhood.
Chris.
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Chris MacDonald, Ph.D., at 7:51 PM
Chris, I support your views. Here is an excerpt from my recent chapter on corporate governance best practices to help clarify part of my reasoning.
"The purpose of corporate governance is to direct and control the activities of an organization by establishing structures, rules, and procedures for decision-making. The most contentious aspects of governance revolve around answers to the questions: “On whose behalf?” and “To what end?” Corporate law of most common law jurisdictions indicates that corporate directors have the fiduciary duty to be loyal to the best interests of the corporation (Black, 1999). According to Tarantino (2008, p. 4), a corporation is a legal person that “requires the actions of real people to operate” in order to properly serve the interests of society. This view is supported not only by the Companies Act of 2006 in the United Kingdom that requires corporate directors to consider social interests (Wikipedia, 2009b) but also by the 2008 Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling suggesting that corporations fairly balance the interests of all stakeholders commensurate with “the corporation’s duties as a responsible citizen” (Tory and Cameron, 2009, p. 3).
The literal legal interpretation of a director’s duties to the corporation views the corporation as a person, subject to public laws that govern the relationship between individuals and society. Governments therefore grant every corporation a legal license to operate by way of a corporate charter. By contrast, the inferred legal interpretation that directors owe duties to shareholders (because shareholders bear the greatest risk due to their residual claim of corporate profits) views corporations as private property. This view subjects corporations to private law that governs relationships between individuals, which include contract law and property law. However, if corporations are not property but legal persons (Bakan, 2004), ownership of a person, even a legal person, could be considered slavery and therefore illegal. Ironically, corporations won the right to be legal persons by successfully claiming rights to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was enacted to end slavery (Nicholls, 2005).
Whether directors primarily serve society or the owners of their company is unclear. If they primarily serve owners, then what value do corporate boards add in owner-managed corporations or those with active, controlling shareholders? What about not-for-profit and government organizations without equity owners? On the other hand, if directors primarily serve a broader constituency of stakeholders (or society at large), is it possible to determine which groups are being served and how directors can prioritize between divergent stakeholder interests? Moreover, if directors are to serve stakeholders’ interests beyond those of their shareholders, why should the election of directors be determined solely by shareholders? This ambiguity about the underlying context within which corporate boards operate makes the job of the director more nuanced and complex."
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Alex Todd, at 12:31 AM
I guess I'm a radical, then, because I don't see why a corporation is anything but the people who comprise it. If no one who was responsible for the Exxon spill still works there, then we should sue the people who were responsible, not the people who work there! If they're all dead, then I guess it's too late to do anything, and we should have acted sooner!
On a fundamental level, I see no reason to treat corporations as anything but groups of individuals.
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PNRJ, at 10:06 PM
PNRJ:
So, then, no corporate property?
A corporation wouldn't be able to buy land, or sign a contract? Or do you actually mean that a few thousand shareholders would alllllll have to sign every contract? That's beyond radical. Am I missing something?
In practical terms, you're talking about abolishing corporations. Which, I guess, you're free to argue for. As long as you're clear that that's what you're proposing.
Chris.
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Chris MacDonald, Ph.D., at 10:12 PM
I just saw an abstract for a neat looking paper by a Northwestern law prof (A. Alschuler) on the related issue of corporate liability. There's a summary at:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2009/10/featured-download-alschuler-on-punishing-corporations.html#at
Among Alschuler's points is this:
"Other defenders of corporate criminal liability view it as frankpledge - a device for persuading everyone in an organization to monitor everyone else. This article questions the propriety of declaring some people guilty of other people’s crimes simply to encourage them to police one another. On the assumption that corporate liability is here to stay, however, the article argues that it is better regarded as a means to induce internal monitoring than as bona fide criminal punishment."
The paper is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491263
Alschuler seems to favour an instrumentalist view -- recognize criminal liability because it promotes the benefits for the broader society that we want corporations to achieve. But he also considers this other approach that's modeled on the ancient notion of "deodand (the punishment of animals and objects that have produced harm)." He links the latter to expressivist (as opposed to instrumentalist) aims -- punish a corporation in order to express society's values (very roughly).
I think the instrumentalist approach is more important -- we attribute criminal responsibility to corporations in order (primarily) to promote the objective of protecting other parts of the society from the corporation.
Re. corporate rights:
1. I don't think expressivist views make nearly as much sense here as they do for corporate responsibilities; and
2. An instrumentalist approach to corporate rights (which I take you to support given your earlier remarks) is mainly geared to the goal of protecting the corporation from other parts of the society. But even this is subsidiary to the ultimate goal of promoting benefits for the broader population (we want to protect corporate rights in order to make corporate endeavours viable, which we want to do because of the benefits corporate enterprises can offer to the whole society).
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praymont, at 2:03 AM
In the United States "flesh and blood persons" speech and press rights are restricted by election laws while legal persons in the form of newspapers and broadcasters speech and press rights are not restricted.
Do you defend superior "RIGHTS" for businesses and inferior "rights" for living persons?
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Richard, at 11:47 PM
Richard:
I don't defend either of those things, and I don't know what makes you think I do. Nothing above suggests that.
Chris.
By
Chris MacDonald, at 10:38 AM
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